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THE MYTH OF THE NEUTRAL AMICUS: 
AMERICAN COURTS AND THEIR 
FRIENDS, 1790-1890 
Stuart Banner* 
An amicus curiae ("friend of the court") is, in modern 
American practice, a non-party to a case who nevertheless has a 
strong enough interest in the case's outcome to file a brief. 
Common amici include the federal and state governments, ideo-
logical organizations like American Civil Liberties Union or the 
Washington Legal Foundation, commercial groups like the 
Chamber of Commerce or the AFL-CIO-in short, anyone with 
a stake in influencing the content of judge-made law. The name 
amicus curiae is generally acknowledged as something of a mis-
nomer, in that very few amici intend primarily to help the court. 
Virtually every amicus hopes instead to advance its own interest 
by helping one party or the other win the case. This mismatch 
between name and function is embodied, for example, in court 
rules that typically require amici to identify the party to the case 
on whose behalf they wish to argue. 
The misnomer is conventionally understood to be a vestige 
of a time when amici actually did render disinterested advice, for 
the purpose of helping the court rather than one of the parties. 
The original role of an amicus, on this view, was that of a neutral 
bystander, someone without a stake in the outcome of a case, 
who offered information to the court gratuitously, just to help 
the court avoid error. The function of an amicus has changed, 
the story goes, but the name has not. This understanding of the 
amicus's history traces back to a 1963 Yale Law Journal article 
by the political scientist Samuel Krislov, who located the sup-
posed "shift from neutrality to advocacy" in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Krislov's conclusion has been repeated many times since.1 
* Professor of Law, UCLA. For helpful comments on earlier drafts I'd like to 
thank Lee Epstein, Joseph Gratz, Dan Klerman, Rick Sander, Eugene Volokh, and Steve 
Yeazel!. 
1. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief' From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 
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In recent years, many courts have even relied on this sup-
posed history to refuse to permit interested non-parties to file 
amicus briefs, on the theory that only the disinterested are eligi-
ble to become amici. As one federal district judge reasoned in 
1999, it would be improper to allow a non-party to participate as 
an amicus where the non-party "has a specific pecuniary interest 
in the defendant's perspective," or where the non-party "makes 
no attempt to present itself as a neutral party. "2 
To put the history of the amicus this way, however, only 
raises further questions, questions that to my knowledge have 
not been raised previously. Who exactly were these neutral amici 
in the early nineteenth-century United States? Why were they 
offering disinterested help to judges? Was there really a time 
when gratuitous public-spirited legal advice was more plentiful 
than it is today? 
We might approach these questions with some skepticism 
about the conventional story of a transformation from neutral to 
partisan amici, because the story fits so perfectly into a common 
but unrealistically nostalgic version of the history of American 
legal practice.3 If one believes that the law was once a noble pro-
fession, staffed by officers of the court rather than mere advo-
cates, and if one thinks of American lawyers as having gradually 
YALE L.J. 694 (1963); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the 
Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990); Lucius 
1. Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Systemic View of the Judicial Function, 29 J. POL. 
53 (1967); Michael J. Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in 
American Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1 (2000); Michael K. Low-
man, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 
41 AM. U. L. REV 1243 (1992). The idea that amici were once supposed to be neutral is 
so ingrained that it can be found even in stray comments in papers on unrelated subjects, 
such as Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 
Nw. U. L. REV. 883 (2001); and Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: 
The Environmental Paradigm, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 308 (2000). Among the many cases 
reciting the same story are Community Assoc. for Restoration of the Env't v. DeRuyter 
Bros. Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Wash. 1999); Overton Power Dist. No. 5 v. 
Watkins, 829 F. Supp. 1523 (D. Nev. 1993); United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143 (6th 
Cir. 1991); Time Oil Co. v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15146 
(W.D. Wash. 1990); Mines v. Olin Corp., 524 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1988); Taylor v. 
Roberts, 475 So. 2d 150 (Miss. 1985); Ferguson v. Brick, 649 S.W.2d 397 (Ark. 1983); and 
Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 1981 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13382 (N.D. Ill.1981). 
2. Sciotto v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 70 F. Supp. 2d 553, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1999); 
see also Goldberg v. City of Philadelphia, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9392 (E.D. Pa. 1994); 
United States v. Andrews, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 860 (N.D. Ill. 1993); American Satellite 
Co. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 547 (1991); United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1157 
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); Tiara Corp. v. Ullenberg Corp., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8102 (N.D. Ill. 
1987); Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
3. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). 
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degenerated into paid mouthpieces for their clients, then one can 
readily believe that the institution of the amicus curiae has un-
dergone the same decline. But if one considers the American 
lawyers of today no more or less venal than ever, the assumed 
change in the function of the amicus curiae becomes a puzzle. 
There is a second reason for revisiting the issue. Krislov 
wrote in the early 1960s, before the existence of computerized 
legal research, so he had no easy way of counting cases. He drew 
his conclusion from a very small sample, a sample that neverthe-
less included cases clearly at odds with the point he was trying to 
prove. Today, with the benefit of an enormous word-searchable 
database of court opinions, we can do better. 
In this paper I accordingly investigate the role of the amicus 
curiae in early American practice. The paper concludes that: 
(1) There was never a time in American practice when an 
amicus was only allowed to offer neutral advice. Some 
amici were partisan even in the early nineteenth century. 
(2) Neutral amici were slightly more common than partisan 
amici through the 1820s. Beginning in the 1830s, how-
ever, partisan amici seeking to advance the interests of 
their clients became much more common than neutral 
amici, and remained so through 1890, the study's end-
point. 
(3) Before the 1870s most neutral amici did not file written 
submissions. Neutral amici were almost always lawyers 
who happened to be present in court, watching the oral 
argument of a case in which they were not involved, and 
their advice was given orally and spontaneously. 
( 4) The change in the middle decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, to amici that were much more likely to be repre-
senting the interests of a client than offering disinterested 
advice, was most likely caused by the shift from an oral 
to a written practice, not by any loss of neutrality on the 
part of lawyers. 
These conclusions are at odds with the conventional under-
standing of the history of the amicus curiae. 
I. THE CASES 
I conducted a Lexis search of all state and federal cases de-
cided between 1790 and 1890 containing the words "amicus" or 
"amici" or the phrase "friend of the court," and then weeded out 
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the cases in which an amicus did not actually appear.4 Joseph 
Gratz, technical editor at Constitutional Commentary, then con-
ducted a similar Westlaw search, which picked up some addi-
tional relevant cases.5 The result was 308 reported cases with 
amicus participation. All308 cases are listed in the appendix. (In 
all but a few, the person designated as the amicus was a lawyer. 
Today it is the lawyer's client who is designated as the amicus, 
but that shift in terminology did not occur until the twentieth 
century.) For each case, I tried to figure out, from the account in 
the reports, the amicus's motive in appearing. This proved im-
possible in 56 of the cases, leaving 252 in which I had a sense of 
why the amicus was participating. 
The resulting group of 252 cases has some strengths and 
some weaknesses as a basis from which to infer the motives of 
amici generally. These are worth discussing before examining 
the data. 
Because the Lexis and Westlaw databases now include all or 
nearly all reported American cases, dating back to the beginning 
of published case reports in each state, we know that the sample 
is extremely small relative to the total number of reported cases. 
Lexis includes 692 cases decided in January 1850 alone, for in-
stance, and that is just one of the 1,212 months covered by the 
sample. It is possible that amici participated in reported cases 
that are not included in the sample, either because their partici-
pation was not reported or because it was reported in a way that 
was not picked up by our searches. The sample is also heavily 
weighted toward the end of the century, but in that respect it is 
representative of the set of reported cases generally, in part be-
cause of improvements in case reporting, but mostly because the 
number of litigated cases rose along with the population. 
The total number of reported cases, moreover, is very small 
relative to the total number of decided cases, a number that is 
unknown and most likely unknowable. Worse, the reported 
cases are a biased subset of the decided cases. They were re-
ported because they were considered the most important-
because they were decided by federal courts or by the highest 
state courts, because they required the development of legal 
4. The cases weeded out were primarily those that included dicta about the proper 
role of an amicus but in which no amicus actually appeared. See, e.g., McFaden v. The 
Exchange, 16 F. Cas. 85 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811); Commonwealth v. Smith, 9 Mass. 107 (1812). 
5. The Westlaw search revealed some cases not available on Lexis, some cases for 
which the Westlaw text showed amicus participation but the Lexis text did not, and some 
cases I had overlooked. 
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principles of wide interest, because they involved high stakes, or 
because of some combination of these factors. This bias would 
make the reported cases a poor sample from which to infer the 
percentage of cases in which amici participated, because amici 
would almost certainly have been more likely to participate in a 
case destined to be reported than in an unreported case. 
If one is interested in the motives of amici rather than the 
frequency of their appearance, however, the bias created by the 
reporting system would pose a problem only if the importance of 
a case disproportionately attracted amici of one variety or an-
other. An important case was probably more likely than an ordi-
nary case to draw an amicus seeking to advance the interest of a 
client, but it was probably also more likely than an ordinary case 
to draw an amicus wishing to offer disinterested information to 
the court. We have no reason to expect that one kind of amicus 
would have been more attracted to the important cases than the 
other. 
The case reports are a more useful source of data than 
readers of today's case reports might expect, because nine-
teenth-century reports often included detailed accounts of oral 
proceedings in court, summaries of the arguments of counsel, 
and histories of the progress of the case in lower courts. It is of-
ten easier to tell why a lawyer is participating in a nineteenth-
century case than it would be today. Over the course of the nine-
teenth century, however, this style of case reporting gradually 
began to change into the modern, less informative style, and that 
change introduces two biases into the data. 
First, the likelihood that an oral remark would be repro-
duced in the reports declines over the century, so the shift in the 
data from oral to written amicus participation is in part an arti-
fact of the change in reporting style. It is possible that oral amici 
were more likely to be disinterested than written amici; if so, 
part of the shift in the data from neutral to partisan amici is also 
an artifact of the change in reporting style. 
Second, the modern style most likely concealed the interest 
of many amici in the later part of the century. There were 
probably many lawyers listed simply as "amici curiae" in reports 
toward the end of the century, who, earlier in the century, would 
have been described as representing a client or advancing the in-
terest of someone other than the court. The percentage of cases I 
had to exclude from the sample because of reporting too terse to 
identify the amicus's motive rises quickly in the later decades, 
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from 4% for 1861-70, to 15% for 1871-80, to 38% for 1881-90. I 
do not know whether, by excluding these cases, I am affecting 
the percentage of neutral amici reported in the remaining cases. 
For all these potential weaknesses as a sample, the group 
of 252 cases also has some strengths. It includes cases from all 
parts of the country, and from every decade of the century, so it 
avoids the regional or temporal bias that would result from 
choosing a more focused sample from a particular state or a par-
ticular time period. It includes cases from every type of court, 
from the United States Supreme Court down to state trial courts. 
(Summaries of state trial court proceedings were often included 
in the report of a higher court's decision.) And most important 
of all, it is the only set of its kind that could be obtained without 
an enormous and probably impractical amount of archival work. 
The cases begin in 1790, the year of the first American case 
reported on Lexis or Westlaw to involve an amicus. They end in 
1890, to encompass the entire period in which the transition 
from neutral to partisan amici is conventionally believed to have 
taken place. 
II. CLASSIFICATION 
As a first cut, I divided the cases into two groups, those in 
which the amicus was neutral, and those in which the amicus was 
partisan. I defined an amicus as "partisan" if he participated in 
the case in order to advance the interests of someone he repre-
sented, or, in cases where it was unclear whether he was repre-
senting someone, if he unambiguously appeared on the side of 
one party or the other. I defined an amicus as "neutral" if he was 
not representing anyone and he was not unambiguously for one 
side or the other. Neutral amici were present in 45 cases between 
1790 and 1890, partisan amici in 207. As mentioned above, there 
were also 56 cases in which the report did not provide enough 
information to make the classification. 
There were a few cases in which the report did provide suf-
ficient information to classify the amicus as neutral or partisan, 
but where the classification required me to exercise some judg-
ment, because the categories are not airtight. I have described 
these judgments parenthetically in the list of cases in the appen-
dix. The distinction between neutrality and partisanship was not 
difficult to make in the large majority of cases. The distinction 
would be much more difficult and subjective with cases from the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, when many amici 
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are ideological organizations that could reasonably be character-
ized either as partisan (in that they have a definite view about 
what the law ought to be) or as neutral (in that they are indiffer-
ent as to the particular parties before the court). Before 1890, 
however, there were no such institutional ideological amici with 
an interest in the long-run development of the law. When amici 
had an interest in a case, it was normally a case-specific interest 
in who would win. 
I then subdivided the neutral cases into two groups, those in 
which the amicus offered his advice orally, and those in which he 
submitted his advice in writing. There were 34 cases of oral ad-
vice, and 11 cases of written advice. 
I subdivided the partisan cases into five groups, according to 
the purpose of the amicus's appearance. 
1) In some cases, the ostensible amicus was in fact the law-
yer for the defendant or the appellee, who was arguing that the 
court lacked jurisdiction over his client for want of some formal 
requirement such as service or notice. Lawyers described them-
selves as amici in this context for fear that if they appeared in 
their true capacity they would be curing the very defect they 
claimed deprived the court of jurisdiction. If the defendant's 
lawyer was asserting, for example, that the case should be dis-
missed because the plaintiff has failed to give his client adequate 
notice, his appearance in court as the defendant's lawyer would 
undercut his argument that his client would suffer harm from 
lack of notice. This use of the amicus device may have originated 
as a subterfuge, but by the early nineteenth century it was an ac-
cepted procedural device for challenging the court's jurisdiction.6 
As the report of one 1823 Connecticut case explained, "the at-
torney of Judson, then, as amicus curiae, informed the court, that 
he, Judson, had had no notice of the entry or pendency of the ac-
tion." When the court decided nevertheless to proceed with the 
case, Judson's lawyer then formally entered his appearance as 
6. For suggestions that this was considered the proper way to raise formal objec-
tions to the court's jurisdiction, see Walker v. Taylor, 1 Stew. & P. 298 (Ala. 1832); 
Whitwell v. Barbier, 7 Cal. 54 (1857). There was some variation among the states in this 
regard. The practice of appearing as amicus to contest the court's jurisdiction was disap-
proved in Sexton v. Pennsylvania & New Jersey Steam-Boat Co., 7 N.J.L. 169 (1824), and 
Taft v. Northern Transp. Co., 56 N.H. 414 (1876). But New Jersey and New Hampshire 
appear to have been unusual. The sample includes cases in this category from eighteen 
states plus the federal courts. More than 40 percent of these cases, 31 of 75, come from 
Alabama. I don't know whether this practice was more common in Alabama or whether 
the Alabama case reports were simply more informative in this regard than those from 
other states. 
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Judson's lawyer.7 There are 75 such cases in the sample, more 
than in any other category. In the table below, these cases are 
entered under the heading "Jurisdiction." 
2) In some cases, the amicus was representing a client who 
had died after becoming a party to the case. The client techni-
cally ceased to be a party to the case upon his death, so his law-
yer was, strictly speaking, no longer representing one of the liti-
gants. These cases are entered under "Dead party." There are 
nine of them. 
3) In some cases, the amicus was speaking on behalf of a 
party to the case who was technically unrepresented by counsel. 
Many of these amici were helping criminal defendants who oth-
erwise lacked a lawyer. The rest were helping a variety of other 
kinds of litigants, but without representing them in a formal 
sense. These cases are entered under "Quasi-lawyer." There are 
33. 
4) In some cases, the amicus was representing a non-party 
to the case who had an interest in the case's outcome. (This is 
the dominant function of an amicus today, although today the 
term refers to the client rather than the lawyer.) These non-
parties were often creditors of one of the litigants, or insurance 
companies who might have been liable to one of the litigants. 
These cases are entered under "Non-party." There are 52 cases 
in this category, second only to the category of lawyers appear-
ing to challenge the court's jurisdiction. 
5) Finally, there are some cases in which the reports unam-
biguously list the amicus as supporting one side or the other but 
provide no further information. These cases are entered under 
"Unclear." There are 38. 
This classification scheme resulted in seven categories of 
cases-two under the general heading of "Neutral," and five un-
der the general heading of "Partisan." 
I then further divided the cases by decade. There are only 
twenty cases in the sample from the period 1790-1820, so I 
treated this period as a single unit rather than dividing it into 
decades. This division resulted in eight chronological classifica-
tions, the 1790-1820 period plus the following seven decades. 
7. Judson v. Blanchard, 4 Conn. 557 (1823). 
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The results of this classification are summarized in the fol-
lowing table. 
Years 
1790-
1820 
1821-
1830 
1831-
1840 
1841-
1850 
1851-
1860 
1861-
1870 
1871-
1880 
1881-
1890 
Total 
Neutral 
Amicus Participation in Reported 
American Cases, 1790-1890 
Partisan 
Not Juris- Dead Quasi- Non-Oral Written dition party lawyer party Unclear known 
13 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 
7 2 4 1 2 2 0 2 
3 1 7 1 2 4 0 0 
4 0 13 2 1 1 1 1 
2 0 15 2 7 9 0 2 
3 0 9 1 4 4 2 1 
1 3 10 2 4 16 10 8 
1 5 12 0 12 15 25 42 
34 11 75 9 33 52 38 56 
Total % 
neutral 
20 65% 
20 50% 
18 22% 
23 18% 
37 6% 
24 13% 
54 9% 
112 9% 
308 18% 
The most important set of figures is in the far right column, 
which presents, for each time period, the percentage of cases in 
which the amicus was neutral. (In calculating these percentages I 
did not include in the denominator the 56 cases in which the re-
ports provide insufficient information as to whether the amicus 
was neutral or partisan.) There were more neutral amici than 
partisan amici in 1790-1820 (thirteen of twenty cases). In 1821-
1830 the numbers of neutral and partisan amici were equal. In 
every decade from 1831-1840 through 1881-1890, however, there 
were many more partisan amici than neutral amici. After 1831-
1840 the percentage of amici who were neutral never rose above 
18% in any decade. 
These percentages suggest that since 1790 there has never 
been a time in American practice in which the amicus curiae was 
exclusively neutral. The amicus was most neutral before the 
1830s, but even then it was a device that seems to have been un-
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derstood to be available regardless of whether the amicus was 
neutral or partisan. 
Of the 22 cases involving neutral amici in the period 1790-
1830, there were only two in which the amicus submitted written 
arguments. Most of these neutral amici were lawyers who hap-
pened to be in the courtroom when a case was being argued, and 
who made what appear to have been spontaneous oral sugges-
tions to the court, typically in order to inform the court of prece-
dents of which the court was unaware. 
In 1800, for example, when the Attorney General of Penn-
sylvania asked the state's Supreme Court to try a particular case 
ahead of others that were waiting to be tried, Alexander Dallas 
happened to be in the courtroom. Dallas was Pennsylvania's 
commonwealth secretary, but he also had a sideline in compil-
ing and publishing the opinions of Pennsylvania courts and the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Dallas mentioned to the court, as an 
amicus, that he knew of a recent and apparently unreported case 
in Pennsylvania's federal court, in which U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice William Patterson had ruled that the federal government 
was entitled to have its cases tried before cases involving other 
parties.8 
Another example: In 1811, as the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court was empanelling the term's grand jury, it turned out that 
John Tucker, one of the grand jurors, was also the source of the 
complaint against one of the suspected criminals whose cases the 
grand jury would be considering. Joseph Story happened to be in 
the room, perhaps as a practicing lawyer, or perhaps because he 
was in the midst of saying farewell to the local legal community 
after having just been appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Story suggested, as an amicus, that Tucker would be unsuitable 
to serve on the grand jury, and recalled that he had read an ac-
count of the trial of Aaron Burr, in Virginia, in which the de-
fense had successfully challenged grand jurors for this reason.9 
8. Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 Yeates 93 (Pa. 1800). 
9. In re Tucker, 8 Mass. 286 (1811). The timing of Story's involvement is uncertain. 
The case was decided in November 1811, but the report does not give the precise date. 
Story was nominated for the Supreme Court seat on November 15 and confirmed by the 
Senate on November 18. It is a measure of how much criminal procedure has changed 
that the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected Story's suggestion. "Those who live in 
the vicinity of persons accused are probably better knowing than others to the general 
character of the parties, and the witnesses," the court reasoned, "and on this account are 
perhaps the more proper members of the grand jury, who will derive useful information 
from their knowledge." 
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The era was one in which legal argument was primarily car-
ried on orally. The body of published American precedent and 
treatises was still very small. Written briefs were rare, even in 
the United States Supreme Court.10 Precedent was stored more 
in the memories of lawyers than in written reports, so the remi-
niscences of lawyers were an important source of knowledge.11 
Lawyers kept current in the law, not just by reading freshly pub-
lished reports as they do today, but also by attending court and 
watching the proceedings. For that reason, aspiring lawyers were 
advised that the best way to learn the law quickly was to go to 
court and listen, advice that is virtually never given todayY As a 
result, it was not unusual for early nineteenth-century cases to be 
litigated before audiences more knowledgeable about relevant 
precedents than the participants in the case. A lawyer listening 
to oral argument might remember a relevant previous case that 
lacked any published record, and he might mention it during the 
argument. Such a lawyer may have been a true friend of the 
court, but he was a friend who was doing virtually no work- no 
research, no writing, none of the labor that goes into modern-
day litigation. He was merely chiming in with a suggestion. 
The frequency of this sort of oral suggestion relative to 
other functions performed by amici plummeted in the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century. By the 1870s and 1880s, neu-
tral amici were swamped by partisan amici, and even the neutral 
amici who submitted written briefs outnumbered the neutral 
amici who offered oral advice. It is probably not a coincidence 
that this change in the role of the amicus occurred just as legal 
argument was shifting from a primarily oral to a primarily writ-
ten practice. As more American case reports and treatises began 
to be published, there would have been fewer occasions on 
which a lawyer hanging around the courtroom would have had 
knowledge of a relevant precedent not known by the court or 
the lawyers for the parties. As lawyers began to make their legal 
arguments primarily in written briefs rather than in open court, 
10. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-
1835, at 203 (Oxford University Press, abridged ed., 1991). The Court required lawyers to 
file "a statement of the material points of the case" in 1795, and required printed briefs 
beginning in 1821, but in 1849 the Court had to announce that lawyers not filing briefs 
would not be heard at oral argument, a rule suggesting that the briefing requirement was 
being ignored. 14 U.S. xiv (1816) (for the 1795 rule); 19 U.S. v (1821); 48 U.S. v (1849). 
11. Cf Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: 
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229 
(1998). 
12. See, e.g., 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 48-50 (L.H. 
Butterfield ed., Harvard University Press, 1961). 
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eavesdroppers to litigation would have become less likely to of-
fer unsolicited suggestions. Lawyers knowledgeable about recent 
cases were less likely to be hanging around the courtroom and 
more likely to be in their offices. The percentage of amici who 
were neutral would have declined in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, without any decline in the altruism of American 
lawyers. 
Amici in today's sense of the word-lawyers representing 
non-parties with an interest in the case-were a familiar feature 
of litigation as far back as the 1810s. They were as common as 
neutral amici in the 1830s, and much more common than neutral 
amici beginning in the 1850s. 
The results reported here suggest that there was a change in 
the nature of the amicus curiae in the nineteenth century United 
States, but it was not the transformation from strict neutrality to 
partisanship that is conventionally thought to have taken place. 
It was a change from an early nineteenth-century mixture of 
neutrality and partisanship in roughly equal measure to a late 
nineteenth-century mixture dominated by partisanship. And it is 
a change that was most likely driven by the changing nature of 
litigation rather than by any change in the partisanship of law-
yers themselves. One does not need to assume that lawyers de-
generated from officers of the court to paid mouthpieces in or-
der to explain the shift in the nature of the amicus. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix includes names and citations for all 308 cases, the 
252 in the sample as well as the 56 for which there was insuffi-
cient information to classify the amicus as neutral or partisan. 
They are divided according to the headings in the table. Within 
each category they are in chronological order. Where I had to 
exercise some judgment in classifying the case, I have provided a 
brief parenthetical explanation following the citation. 
NEUTRAL-ORAL 
Vasse v. Spicer, 2 U.S. 111 (Pa. 1790) 
Respublica v. Cobbet, 3 Yeates 93 (Pa. 1800) 
Hun v. Bowne, 1 Cai. R. 23 (N.Y. Sup. 1803) 
Watson v. Depeyster & Co., 1 Cai. R. 66 (N.Y. Sup. 1803) 
Lackey v. McDonald, 1 Cai. R. 116 (N.Y. Sup. 1803) 
Spencer v. Webb, 1 Cai. R. 118 (N.Y. Sup. 1803) 
Drew v. Canady, 1 Mass. 158 (1804) 
Blanchard v. Wild, 1 Mass. 342 (1805) 
Beasley v. Owen, 13 Va. 449 (1809) 
In re Tucker, 8 Mass. 286 (1811) 
Walsh v. Nourse, 5 Binn. 381 (Pa. 1813) 
Beatty's Adm'rs v. Burnes' Adm'rs, 12 U.S. 98 (1814) 
Mansfield v. Mansfield, 13 Mass. 412 (1816) 
Boqua v. Ware, 6 N.J.L. 151 (1822) 
Alcott v. Phelps, 1 Cow. 170 (N.Y. Sup. 1823) 
Jackson v. Chapman, 3 Cow. 390 (N.Y. Sup. 1824) 
James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220 (Pa. 1825) 
State v. Murat, 9 N.J.L. 3 (1827) 
Banner v. McMurray, 12 N.C. 218 (1827) 
People v. TenEyck, 2 Wend. 617 (1829) 
Beeson v. Beeson, 1 Del. 466 (1834) 
Bowman v. James, 6 La. 124 (1834) 
Benjamin v. Boyce, 2 Del. 316 (1837) 
Dockstader v. Sammons, 4 Hill546 (N.Y. Sup. 1842) 
Muire v. Smith, 41 Va. 458 (1843) 
Wolfe v. Gardner, 4 Del. 338 (1845) 
Brewington v. Lowe, 1 Ind. 21 (1848) 
United States ex ret. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1855) 
Reynolds v. Harris, 8 Cal. 617 (1857) 
Commonwealth v. Cooley, 83 Mass. 358 (1861) 
Ex parte Northington, 37 Ala. 496 (1861) 
Tate v. Powe, 64 N.C. 644 (1870) 
Braden's Case, 10 Ct. Cl. 412 (1874) 
Gardner v. People, 106 Ill. 76 (1883) 
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NEUTRAL- WRITTEN 
Word v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. 743 (1827), Commonwealth v. Garth, 30 Va. 
761 (1827) (a pair of cases raising the same issue, litigated together, and 
drawing the same amicus submission, so I have counted them as one) 
Thompson v. Clay, 24 Ky. 413 (1829) 
Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 395 (1840) 
Opinion of the Justices, 53 N.H. 640 (1873) 
In reAssignment of Judges, 34 Ohio St. 431 (1878) 
Todd v. The Bark Tulchen, 2 F. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1880) 
In re Attorney General of New Mexico, 2 N.M. 49 (1881) 
In reSt. Louis Institute of Christian Science, 27 Mo. App. 633 (1887) 
People v. Starks, 1 N.Y.S. 721 (1888) 
In re Appropriations by General Assembly, 13 Colo. 316 (1889) 
In re Speakership of the House of Representatives, 15 Colo. 520 (1890) 
PARTISAN- JURISDICTION 
Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 F. Cas. 367 (C.C.D.Pa. 1801) 
Dean v. Legg, 7 F. Cas. 304 (C.C.D.C. 1807) 
Hunt v. Whitney, 4 Mass. 620 (1808) 
Commonwealth v. Emery, 2 Binn. 257 (Pa. 1810) 
Livingston v. Dorgenois, 11 U.S. 577 (1813) 
Malcom v. Rogers, 1 Cow. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) 
Judson v. Blanchard, 4 Conn. 557 (1823) 
State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 1 Stew. 347 (Ala. 1828) 
Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) 
Nabors v. The Governor, 3 Stew. & P. 15 (Ala. 1832) 
Pearsall & Stanton v. Middlebrook, 2 Stew. & P. 406 (Ala. 1832) 
Rather v. State, 1 Port. 132 (Ala. 1834) 
Lecat v. Salle, 1 Port. 287 (Ala. 1835) 
Rider v. Nelson & Albemarle Union Factory, 34 Va. 154 (1836) 
Richardson v. Cleaveland & Huggins, 5 Port. 251 (Ala. 1837) 
Hendricks v. Johnson, 6 Port. 472 (Ala. 1838) 
Lindner v. Aaron & Nelson, 6 Miss. 581 (1841) 
Bierne & McMahon v. The Steam Boat Triumph, 2 Ala. 738 (1841) 
Reynolds v. Bell, 3 Ala. 57 (1841) 
Crocker v. Dunkin, 6 Blackf. 535 (Ind. 1843) 
Ham v. Rogers, 6 Blackf. 559 (Ind. 1843) 
Hopkins v. Gary, 7 Ala. 46 (1844) 
Alonzo Childs & Co. v. Risk, 1 Morris 439 (Iowa Terr. 1845) 
Kavanaugh v. Brown, 1 Tex. 481 (1846) 
Sherry v. Denn, 8 Blackf. 542 (Ind. 1847) 
Cartwright v. Chabert, 3 Tex. 261 (1848) 
Dent v. Smith, 15 Ala. 286 (1849) 
Glover v. Glover, 18 Ala. 367 (1850) 
Pendleton v. Vanausdal, 2 Ind. 54 (1850) 
Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 3 Ind. 8 (1851) 
State ex rei. Claunch v. Castleberry, 23 Ala. 85 (1853) 
Sherrod's Executors v. Hampton, 25 Ala. 652 (1854) 
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Owen v. Jordan, 27 Ala. 608 (1855) 
Church v. Drummond, 7 Ind. 13 (1855) 
Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 57 (1859) 
Hust v. Conn, 12 Ind. 225 (1859) 
Holtzclaw v. Ware, 34 Ala. 307 (1859) 
Day v. Washburn, 64 U.S. 309 (1859) 
Buchanan v. Beard, 13 Ind. 406 (1859) 
New Albany & Salem R.R. Co. v. Combs, 13 Ind. 420 (1859) 
Andrews v. Beck, 23 Tex. 455 (1859) 
Simmons v. Varnum, 36 Ala. 92 (1860) 
Morehouse v. Potter, 15 Ind. 477 (1860) 
Knight v. Low, 15 Ind. 374 (1860) 
Barney v. Barney, 14 Iowa 189 (1862) 
Wiswell v. Starr, 50 Me. 381 (1862) 
Booth v. Ableman, 16 Wis. 460 (1863), 18 Wis. 495 (1864) 
Forrester v. Forrester, 39 Ala. 320 (1864) 
Ex parte Stickney, 40 Ala. 160 (1866) 
Marco v. Low, 55 Me. 549 (1867) 
Gallegos v. Pino, 1 N.M. 410 (1867) 
Morris v. Hall, 41 Ala. 510 (1868) 
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Alabama & Tennessee R.R. Co. v. Burns, McKibbin & Co., 43 Ala. 169 (1869) 
Waddill v. John, 48 Ala. 232 (1872), 57 Ala. 93 (1876) 
Ex parte Bell, 48 Ala. 285 (1872) 
Ex parte Collins, 49 Ala. 69 (1873) 
Davidson v. Washburn, 56 Ala. 596 (1876) 
King v. Harbor Board, 57 Ala. 135 (1876) 
Kramer v. Holster, 55 Miss. 243 (1877) 
Ex parte McCoy, 64 Ala. 201 (1879) 
St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McReynolds, 24 Kan. 368 (1880) 
Brown v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R.R. Co., 72 Mo. 567 (1880) 
Nabers' Adm'r v. Meredith, 67 Ala. 333 (1880) 
Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Beaty, 71 Ga. 160 (1883) 
Burnett v. McCiuey, 78 Mo. 676 (1883) 
State v. Jefferson Iron Co., 60 Tex. 312 (1883) 
Pollock v. Simpson, 67 Iowa 519 (1885) 
Jones v. City of Jefferson, 66 Tex. 576 (1886) 
Ex parte Henderson, 84 Ala. 36 (1887) 
Proctor v. Pettitt, 25 Neb. 96 (1888) 
Western Railway of Alabama v. Sistrunk, 85 Ala. 352 (1888) 
Dean v. Gerlach, 34 Ill. App. 233 (1889) 
Insurance Co. of North America v. McLimans & Coyle, 28 Neb. 653 (1890) 
In re Assignment of Zwang, 39 Mo. App. 356 (1890) 
Alexander Bros. v. Jones, 90 Ala. 474 (1890) 
PARTISAN-DEAD PARTY 
Walker v. King, 2 Aik. 204 (Vt. 1827) 
Read v. Hatch, 36 Mass. 47 (1837) 
Massey v. Steele's Adm'r, 11 Ala. 340 (1847) 
Russ v. Dow, 32 Me. 590 (1850) 
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Armstrong v. Nixon, 16 Tex. 610 (1856) 
Guyer v. Wookey, 18 Ill. 536 (1857) 
Winship v. Conner, 42 N.H. 341 (1861) 
Blaisdell v. Harris, 52 N.H. 191 (1872) 
Tapley v. Martin, 116 Mass. 275 (1874); Martin v. Tapley, 119 Mass. 116 (1875); 
Tapley v. Goodsell, 122 Mass. 176 (1877) (installments of the same case) 
PARTISAN-QUASI-LAWYER 
United States v. Hare, 26 F. Cas. 148 (C.C.D.Md. 1818) 
Chambers v. Astor, 1 Mo. 327 (1823) 
State v. Jim, 12 N.C. 508 (1828) 
State v. Britt, 14 N.C. 122 (1831) 
The David Pratt, 7 F. Cas. 22 (D. Me. 1839) 
Goddard v. Coffin, 10 F. Cas. 505 (C.C.D. Me. 1849) 
State v. Bradley, 6 La. Ann. 554 (1851) 
Rankin v. Sherwood, 33 Me. 509 (1851) 
Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Cas. 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (fugitive slave case, where 
Pennsylvania has imprisoned marshals for catching slave, and amicus is really 
arguing for Pennsylvania in opposition to marshals' habeas corpus petition) 
State v. Patten, 10 La. Ann. 299 (1855) 
Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa 70 (1855) 
Collett v. Frazier, 56 N.C. 398 (1857) 
Darlington v. Warner, 14 Ind. 368 (1860) 
Miles v. Bradford, 22 Md. 170 (1864) (lawyers really representing Governor of 
Maryland, who refuses to recognize court's authority) 
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866) (Attorney General really represent-
ing Andrew Johnson) 
Metzger v. Waddell, 1 N.M. 400 (1867) 
State v. Izard, 48 S.C.L. 209 (1867) 
In re Devaux, 54 Ga. 673 (1875) (amicus really representing opponents of ap-
plication of Freemasons for a corporate charter, in procedural context where 
there is no party in the case to oppose the Freemasons) 
In re Corbin, 8 S.C. 390 (1877) 
In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (amicus really representing anti-
Chinese sentiment in community, in opposition to Chinese person's applica-
tion for naturalization, in procedural context where there is no party in the 
case to oppose the application) 
Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220 (1880) (when lawyer appeals after being dis-
barred for publishing an editorial criticizing the court, amici really represent-
ing the bar in opposing appeal) 
Lelia Robinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376 (1881) (amici really representing Boston 
bar, in opposing what the court characterizes as the first application by a 
woman for admission as an attorney in the history of the state) 
State v. Williams, 34 La. Ann. 87 (1882) 
Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 42 (1884) (in opposing an appeal from the county 
court's denial of an application for a liquor license, amicus is really repre-
senting the government) 
Cowan v. Cowan, 139 Mass. 377 (1885) 
Territory v. Murray, 7 Mont. 251 (1887) 
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People v. Gibbs, 70 Mich. 425 (1888) 
Cox v. Gress, 51 Ark. 224 (1889) 
United States v. Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ, 6 Utah 9 (1889) 
State v. Brown, 41 La. Ann. 345 (1889) 
Stephens v. Hall, 10 N.Y.S. 753 (1890) 
In re Losasso, 15 Colo. 163 (1890) 
Ex parte Bergman, 3 Wyo. 396 (1890) 
PARTISAN-NON-PARTY 
The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 697 (C.C.D.Mass. 1813) 
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823) 
Green v. Willis, 1 Wend. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828) 
Harrison v. Nixon, 34 U.S. 483 (1835) 
In re Bank of Niagara, 6 Paige Ch. 213 (N.Y.Ch. 1836) 
Stearns v. Stearns, 10 Vt. 540 (1838) 
Planters' & Merchants' Bank of Mobile v. Andrews, 8 Port. 404 (Ala. 1839) 
Townsend and Brothers v. Davis, 1 Ga. 495 (1846) 
Lane v. Leet, 2 Ind. 535 (1851) 
Miller v. Keith, 26 Miss. 166 (1853) 
The Byron, 4 F. Cas. 956 (S.D. Fla. 1854) 
Ex parte Yeager, 52 Va. 655 (1854) 
Ex parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855) 
Mussina v. Alling, 11 La. Ann. 568 (1856) 
Ex parte Russell, 29 Ala. 717 (1857) 
Cockrell v. McGraw, 33 Ala. 526 (1859) 
United States v. Carillo, 25 F. Cas. 310 (1859) 
Ex parte Fleming, 69 U.S. 759 (1864) 
Romeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich. 449 (1868) 
Ex parte Schenck, 63 N.C. 601 (1869) 
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New London Northern R.R. Co. v. Boston & Albany R.R. Co., 102 Mass. 386 
(1869) 
State ex ret. Bd. of Sch. Directors v. Mayor, 23 La. Ann. 358 (1871) 
May v. Courtnay, Tennant & Co., 47 Ala. 185 (1872) 
The Confiscation Cases, 6 F. Cas. 270 (C.C.D. La. 1872) 
Branch v. Mechanics' Bank, 50 Ga. 413 (1873) 
Gordon v. Green, 113 Mass. 259 (1873) 
Ex parte Greeley, 10 F. Cas. 1069 (C.C.D. Mass. 1873) 
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874) 
Acosta v. The Halcyon, 1 F. Cas. 58 (S.D. Fla. 1877) 
People ex ret. Attorney-General v. Security Life Ins. Co., 71 N.Y. 222 (1877) 
Malone v. The Pedro, 16 F. Cas. 556 (S.D. Fla. 1878) 
Hawes v. Contra Costa Water Co., 11 F. Cas. 862 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1878) 
Hammond v. Lesseps, 31 La. Ann. 337 (1879) 
State v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204 (1879) 
Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396 (1880) 
Burke v. Flood, 1 F. 541 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) 
Jones v. United States, 48 Wis. 385 (1880) 
Kimball v. Penhallow, 60 N.H. 448 (1881) 
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Rose, 45 Mich. 284 (1881) 
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City of Cambridge v. City of Boston, 130 Mass. 357 (1881) 
New Orleans Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 567 (1881) 
Surget v. Chase, 33 La. Ann. 833 (1881) 
State ex rei. Hudd v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318 (1882) 
Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 U.S. 412 (1883) 
Butterworth v. United States, 112 U.S. 50 (1884) 
Rosenthal v. His Creditors, 2 McGI. 382 (La. App. 1884) 
Rice, Stix & Co., 45 Ark. 34 (1885) 
City & County of San Francisco v. Liverpool & London &Globe Ins. Co., 74 
Cal. 113 (1887) 
United States ex ret. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (1888) 
Ex parte Lloyd, 78 Cal. 421 (1889) 
Parker v. North British &Mercantile Ins. Co., 42 La. Ann. 428 (1890) 
County Ct. v. Boreman, 34 W.Va. 87 (1890) 
PARTISAN- UNCLEAR 
Bryan v. Sundberg, 5 Tex. 418 (1849) 
People ex ret. Taylor v. Brennan, 39 Barb. 522 (N.Y. Sup. 1863) 
Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336 (1869) 
Barr v. Armstrong, 56 Mo. 577 (1874) 
Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 116 Mass. 315 (1874) 
State ex rei. Fichtenkamm v. Gambs, 68 Mo. 289 (1878) 
Friedman v. Nelson, 53 Cal. 589 (1879) 
Ex parte Laboyteaux, 65 Ind. 545 (1879) 
Ex parte Frazer, 54 Cal. 94 (1880) 
Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111 (1880) 
State ex rei. Carcass v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 32 La. Ann. 719 (1880) 
Moore v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 726 (1880) 
Anderson v. His Creditors, 32 La. Ann. 892 (1880) 
State ex rei. Widow Harper v. Judges of the Ct. of Appeals, 33 La. Ann. 358 
(1881) 
Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590 (1883) 
County of Bay v. Bullock, 51 Mich. 544 (1883) 
Urton v. Wilson, 65 Cal. 11 (1884) 
Timm v. Harrison, 109 Ill. 593 (1884) 
Morgan's Louisiana & Texas R.R. &Steamship Co. v. Board of Health, 36 La. 
Ann. 666 (1884) 
Graves v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 5 Mont. 556 (1885) 
People ex ret. Leverson v. Thompson, 67 Cal. 627 (1885) 
Smith v. Strother, 68 Cal. 194 (1885) 
Ebert v. Beedy, 113 III. 316 (1885) 
Morris v. Lalaurie, 38 La. Ann. 47 (1887) 
Reed v. His Creditors, 39 La. Ann. 115 (1887) 
Grupe v. Byers, 73 Cal. 271 (1887) 
In re Estate of Mary Cunningham, 73 Cal. 558 (1887) 
Ex parte Kohler, 74 Cal. 38 (1887) 
People v. City & County of San Francisco, 75 Cal. 388 (1888) 
Turlock lrrig. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360 (1888) 
Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 599 (1888) 
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In re Douglass, 41 La. Ann. 765 (1889) 
Kennedy v. Board of Educ., 82 Cal. 483 (1890) 
People v. Toal, 85 Cal. 333 (1890) 
United Land Ass'n v. Knight, 85 Cal. 448 (1890) 
Davies v. City of Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37 (1890) 
Vorwerk v. Nolte, 87 Cal. 236 (1890) 
Board of Educ. v. Common Council of Detroit, 80 Mich. 548 (1890) 
NOT KNOWN 
De Armas' Case, 10 Mart. (o.s.) 158 (La. 1821) 
Morton v. Sanders's Heirs, 25 Ky. 192 (1829) 
Hallowell v. Williams, 4 Pa. 339 (1846) 
Jenny v. O'Flynn, 5 Mich. 215 (1858) 
Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa 470 (1860) 
People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 (1867) 
In re Commissioners of the First Draining Dist., 27 La. Ann. 20 (1875) 
Melvin v. Melvin, 72 N.C. 384 (1875) 
Price v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Mo. App. 262 (1877) 
Lesassier & Binder v. Board of Liquidation, 30 La. Ann. 611 (1878) 
State ex ref. Agusti v. Houston, 30 La. Ann. 1174 (1878) 
In re Guenzler, 70 Mo. 39 (1879) 
Succession of Hugh McCloskey, 32 La. Ann. 146 (1880) 
State ex rei. Newman v. Judge Sixth District Court, 32 La. Ann. 207 (1880) 
Life Ass'n of America v. Hall, 33 La. Ann. 49 (1881) 
De Jarnatt v. Cooper, 59 Cal. 703 (1881) 
People ex ref. Dean v. Board of County Comm'rs, 6 Colo. 202 (1882) 
Kidder v. Stevens, 60 Cal. 414 (1882) 
Chicot County v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200 (1882) 
Davidson v. Houston, 35 La. Ann. 492 (1883) 
Cary v. Richardson, 35 La. Ann. 505 (1883) 
State ex ref. Perche v. Earhart, 35 La. Ann. 603 (1883) 
People ex ref. Kellogg v. Fleming, 7 Colo. 230 (1883) 
Friedler v. Chotard, 36 La. Ann. 276 (1884) 
Cochran v. Cobb, 43 Ark. 180 (1884) 
Bailey v. Board of Supervisors, 66 Cal. 10 (1884) 
Eager, Ellerman & Co. v. City of New Orleans, 36 La. Ann. 933 (1884) 
Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 (1886) 
McCloy & Trotter v. Arnett, 47 Ark. 445 (1886) 
Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465 (1886) 
Hutchinson v. Lemcke, 107 Ind. 121 (1886) 
Pfeiffer v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 74 Cal. 156 (1887) 
Verdugo de Sepulveda v. Baugh, 74 Cal. 468 (1887) 
In re Lake, 40 La. Ann. 142 (1888) 
Succession of Samuel Stewart, 41 La. Ann. 127 (1889) 
Richmond v. Mississippi Mills, 52 Ark. 30 (1889) 
Glidewell v. Martin, 51 Ark. 559 (1889) 
Brooks v. Fischer, 79 Cal. 173 (1889) 
Central Irrig. Dist. v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351 (1889) 
Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 81 Cal. 182 (1889) 
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Touzalin v. City of Omaha, 25 Neb. 817 (1889) 
Griffith v. Smith, 27 Neb. 47 (1889) 
People v. Hemme, 24 P. 313 (Cal. 1890) 
Ex parte Reilly, 85 Cal. 632 (1890) 
De Guyer v. Banning, 25 P. 252 (Cal. 1890) 
Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 133 Ill. 443 (1890) 
In re Nieman, 14 S.W. 25 (Tex. 1890) 
In re Walker's Estate, 6 Utah 369 (1890) 
Ex parte Ah You, 82 Cal. 339 (1890) 
Spring Valley Water Works v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286 (1890) 
Cheyney v. Smith, 3 Ariz. 143 (1890) 
People ex ref. Longenecker v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565 (1890) 
In reFunding of County Indebtedness, 15 Colo. 421 (1890) 
In reHouse Bill No. 10, 15 Colo. 600 (1890) 
In re the Constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 69, 15 Colo. 601 (1890) 
Ex parte Boswell, 86 Cal. 232 (1890) 
